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Time perception is studied with subjective or semi-objective psychophysical methods.
With subjective methods, observers provide quantitative estimates of duration and data
depict the psychophysical function relating subjective duration to objective duration.
With semi-objective methods, observers provide categorical or comparative judgments
of duration and data depict the psychometric function relating the probability of a
certain judgment to objective duration. Both approaches are used to study whether
subjective and objective time run at the same pace or whether time flies or slows
down under certain conditions. We analyze theoretical aspects affecting the interpretation
of data gathered with the most widely used semi-objective methods, including
single-presentation and paired-comparison methods. For this purpose, a formal model
of psychophysical performance is used in which subjective duration is represented via
a psychophysical function and the scalar property. This provides the timing component
of the model, which is invariant across methods. A decisional component that varies
across methods reflects how observers use subjective durations to make judgments
and give the responses requested under each method. Application of the model shows
that psychometric functions in single-presentation methods are uninterpretable because
the various influences on observed performance are inextricably confounded in the
data. In contrast, data gathered with paired-comparison methods permit separating out
those influences. Prevalent approaches to fitting psychometric functions to data are
also discussed and shown to be inconsistent with widely accepted principles of time
perception, implicitly assuming instead that subjective time equals objective time and that
observed differences across conditions do not reflect differences in perceived duration
but criterion shifts. These analyses prompt evidence-based recommendations for best
methodological practice in studies on time perception.
Keywords: perception of duration, psychophysical methods, psychophysical function, psychometric function,
probabilistic models
“There is nothing so practical as a good theory”
Lewin (1951, p. 169)
“There is nothing so theoretical as a good method”
Greenwald (2012)
INTRODUCTION
Time is crucial in our lives. We do not have a sense organ for
time, but even infants 3–4 months old show some ability to dis-
criminate short durations of different lengths (Provasi et al., 2011;
Gava et al., 2012). During childhood and adolescence we develop
a fine-grained perception of time surely based on our daily expe-
rience with objective time. Finely-tuned time perception seems to
arise after higher-level cognitive processes are sufficiently devel-
oped (Block et al., 1999; Droit-Volet, 2013) and given explicit
experience with objective time. It is nevertheless unclear whether
our ability to represent and quantify time stems from a timing
mechanism (an “internal clock”) that keeps track of time and
can be read like a watch or, rather, only reflects our learning to
translate experienced intervals into magnitudes expressed in the
physical units of time that we got accustomed to. In the former
case, empirical differences between subjective and objective time
would be caused by an acceleration or deceleration of the inter-
nal clock, which thus gives an inexact reading (i.e., the internal
clock is fast or slow); in the latter, they would reflect a subjec-
tive lengthening or shortening of duration, which nevertheless
gets properly quantified afterwards. Figuring out which of these
processes is taking place seems impossible because the process
is unobservable and any observable outcome is compatible with
these two and maybe also other accounts (Block, 1990; Grondin,
2010). Mechanistic accounts of timing processes have the sta-
tus of metaphors (Wackermann, 2011), but difficulties to unravel
those processes does not reduce our interest in investigating the
phenomenon of time perception and the factors that affect it.
Time perception studies range from descriptions of the limits
of our ability to judge and discriminate elapsed time or time dif-
ferences, through the study of subject variables or stimulus condi-
tions that affect such judgments, to assessments of distorted time
perception in patients with psychiatric or neurological disorders.
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Detailed reviews have been published that describe the state and
outcomes of this research in several areas (e.g., Grondin, 2010;
Spence and Parise, 2010; Vroomen and Keetels, 2010; Allman
and Meck, 2012; Chen and Vroomen, 2013; Allman et al., 2014)
and this paper will not provide yet another review of this type.
Our focus is instead on the methods used to gather data on
the relation between subjective and objective time and on the
conflicting or puzzling results that use of alternative (and presum-
ably interchangeable) methods sometimes provides. Our main
goal is to analyze the assumptions underlying these methods
and to derive implications on the interpretation of data gath-
ered with them. For this purpose, widely accepted principles
of time perception will be built into a model of performance
in psychophysical tasks in order to analyze the underpinnings,
implications, and shortcomings of the various methods. To define
our context, section Experimental Methods Used in Studies on
Time Perception gives a brief overview of the classes of subjective
and semi-objective methods used in studies on time perception.
Section A Unified Model of Performance across Semi-Objective
Psychophysical Tasks presents a model of performance in semi-
objective psychophysical tasks that includes widely accepted com-
ponents. Application of the model to different tasks in sections
Single-Presentation Methods and Paired-Comparison Methods
reveals how they can render conflicting results when time per-
ception as implemented in the model is invariant across tasks.
These results and their implications for best research practices
are discussed in section General Discussion and Evidence-Based
Recommendations.
EXPERIMENTAL METHODS USED IN STUDIES ON TIME
PERCEPTION
Research on time perception comprises two major types of study
(Grondin, 2010): retrospective and prospective. Retrospective
studies assess remembered time by asking observers to quantify
the time elapsed while they had been engaged in a task performed
without knowledge that their time estimates would be eventually
assessed (e.g., Kellaris and Kent, 1992; Friedman and Kemp, 1998;
Campbell and Bryant, 2007; Arstila, 2012;Misuraca and Teuscher,
2013; Dong andWyer, 2014). In contrast, prospective studies assess
immediately experienced time through psychophysical tasks that
can be categorized as subjective or semi-objective. In subjective
methods, observers report the perceived duration of the stimu-
lus presented in each trial, whether through the verbal estimation
task (requesting a numerical estimate of presentation duration),
the temporal reproduction task (asking observers to reproduce a
duration of the same length), or the temporal production task (ask-
ing observers to produce a duration lasting the amount of time
indicated verbally). The ultimate goal of subjective methods is
to estimate the psychophysical function expressing the functional
relation of subjective to objective time (see Figure 1), a historical
endeavor of classical psychophysics (Eisler, 1976; Allan, 1983).
Semi-objective methods also involve the display of stimuli
whose presentation duration varies across trials but observers
are not requested to produce quantitative estimates. Instead,
they are asked for categorical or comparative judgments. Semi-
objective tasks include single-presentation methods and paired-
comparison methods. In the former, each trial presents a single
FIGURE 1 | Sample psychophysical functions described by Equation
(1). The psychophysical function describes the mapping of objective time
(in physical units, e.g., ms) onto subjective time (in arbitrary units). (A) With
α = 1, β = 1, and τ = 0, μ is the identity function by which subjective
duration equals objective duration. (B) With α = 5, β = 0.75, and τ = −10,
μ is a concave function by which durations shorter than t = 654ms are
subjectively perceived longer than they are whereas increasingly longer
durations are progressively compressed. Solid black lines illustrate the
mapping for sample durations t = 200ms, t = 1200ms, and their midpoint
at t = 700ms. Dashed lines in the bottom panel illustrate that, due to the
non-linear μ, the midpoint between μ(200) and μ(1200) on the vertical axis
does not correspond to the midpoint between t = 200ms and t = 1200ms
on the horizontal axis.
stimulus and a categorical response is requested; in the latter, two
stimuli are presented in each trial and a comparison is requested.
(Multiple-comparison methods involving three or more stimuli
per trial will not be discussed here.) Single-presentation methods
include the bisection task (asking observers to report whether the
currently displayed duration is closer to a short or to a long exem-
plar repeatedly displayed in a preceding training phase) and the
temporal generalization task (asking observers to report whether
or not the currently displayed duration is the same as an exemplar
duration also repeatedly displayed in a preceding training phase).
Paired-comparison methods include the two-alternative forced-
choice (2AFC) or comparative task (asking observers to indicate
which of the two stimuli in each trial had, say, a longer dura-
tion) and the equality or same–different task (asking observers
to indicate whether or not the two stimuli had the same dura-
tion), although many other variants exist. Almost invariably,
semi-objective methods are used to estimate the psychometric
function describing how the probability of some response varies
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with duration (see Figure 2). Landmark points on the psychome-
tric function are subsequently extracted to characterize aspects of
time perception, including the bisection point (BP, the 50% point
on the psychometric function in a bisection task), the point of
subjective equality (PSE, the location of the peak of the psycho-
metric function in the temporal generalization task or the 50%
point on the psychometric function in the 2AFC task), or the
difference limen (DL, a measure of the spread of a psychometric
function). Also often computed is the Weber ratio (WR) defined
as either DL/BP or DL/PSE. Superficially, psychometric functions
estimated with semi-objective methods offer an account that dif-
fers from that provided by psychophysical functions estimated
with subjective methods. Yet, the psychometric function embeds
the psychophysical function, as will be seen later.
Prospective studies typically include several conditions to
investigate differences in subjective time across experimental
FIGURE 2 | Sample psychometric functions in the temporal
generalization task (A) and the temporal bisection task (B). Each function
in each panel results from the psychophysical function plotted with the same
color in Figure 1, with additional assumptions coming from the models
described in sections A UnifiedModel of Performance across Semi-Objective
Psychophysical Tasks and Single-Presentation Methods. Specifically, in the
top panel, δ = 150 whereas in the bottom panel, δ = 70 and ξ = 0.5. In both
cases γ = 0.15. The red curve in (A) is the same psychometric function
plotted in Figure 4A; the red curve in (B) is the same psychometric function
plotted with continuous black trace in Figure 5A.
manipulations (Ulbrich et al., 2007; Wearden et al., 2010; Ogden,
2013) or subject variables (Carlson and Feinberg, 1970; Eisler and
Eisler, 1994; Glicksohn and Hadad, 2012). Differences in time
perception could naturally be expected to occur as a result of these
factors. Our theoretical analyses will assess how the use of alterna-
tive semi-objective tasks and the way in which data are analyzed
can speak about these differences.
A UNIFIED MODEL OF PERFORMANCE ACROSS
SEMI-OBJECTIVE PSYCHOPHYSICAL TASKS
This section presents a unified model of performance in all the
semi-objective psychophysical tasks used to investigate time per-
ception. Specific models have been proposed for individual tasks,
but they are not always applicable to other tasks and, thus,
they offer a fragmentary view of time perception. The model
used for our purpose here extends the signal detection theory
(SDT) model of Gibbon (1981), which was indeed the basis for
most models of performance in semi-objective tasks. The model
includes a timing component and a decisional component deter-
mining how observers use the outcome of the timing component
to make a judgment and give a response.
For the timing component, the model assumes that objective
time is internally represented as described by the psychophysical
function μ, irrespective of the mechanism by which this repre-
sentation is obtained. The psychophysical function μ reflects a
mapping of objective onto subjective time that can be measured
with subjective methods. This does not imply that the psy-
chophysical function estimated with those methods for some par-
ticular stimulus should exactly govern the judgments expressed
by observers in semi-objective tasks with the same stimulus.
Psychophysical functions vary with the subjective method used
to estimate them (Carlson and Feinberg, 1970; Angrilli et al.,
1997; Gil and Droit-Volet, 2011), but also with instructions
(Rattat and Droit-Volet, 2012) or with the interface used to col-
lect responses (Mioni et al., 2014). Yet, judgments reported in
semi-objective tasks must arise from a representation of time
analogous to that subserving performance in subjective tasks.
Extensive research has shown that the psychophysical function
for duration is well-approximated by the three-parameter power
function
μ(t) = α(t − τ)β , (1)
with an exponent β close to unity and a shift τ close to zero.
Parameter values vary across stimulus types and experimental
conditions (Marks and Stevens, 1968; Fagot, 1975; Eisler, 1976;
Dawson and Miller, 1978; Allan, 1983) and one must consider a
family μi, in which the subscript (also in the parameters) denotes
condition. Within a condition, subjective duration exceeds objec-
tive duration within the range of t for which μi(t) > t whereas
subjective duration is shorter than objective duration wher-
ever μi(t) < t. Figure 1 showed two psychophysical functions
described by Equation (1). Ifμ(t) = t (Figure 1A), subjective and
objective time run identically; if β = 1 (Figure 1B), subjective
time runs faster or slower than real time (see Gibbon, 1986, his
Figure 1). Across conditions, μi(t) = μj(t) implies that time runs
(relatively) faster in one condition than in the other.
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The parameters ofμ are estimated from the durations reported
by observers across repeated presentations of a set of objective
durations. The fitted function thus reflects the average subjective
duration of a stimulus of duration t. Scalar expectancy the-
ory derived from studies with non-human animals (Church and
Deluty, 1977; Gibbon, 1977; Church and Gibbon, 1982) posits
that the standard deviation of subjective duration is proportional
to the average subjective duration at t, namely,
σ(t) = γμ(t). (2)
This is known as the scalar variance assumption or the scalar
property. A family of functions σi must also be considered across
conditions. With scalar variance, the coefficient of variation
σi(t)/μi(t) of the distribution of subjective durations equals γi
at all t. Scalar variance holds only approximately in human tim-
ing although the standard deviation certainly increases with t
(Wearden, 1991b; Lewis and Miall, 2009). In any case, the sub-
jective duration S of a stimulus of duration t under condition i
can be regarded as a random variable with mean μi(t) and stan-
dard deviation σi(t) and, without loss of generality, S is assumed
to be normally distributed (Figure 3). This provides the output of
the timing component in the model.
This characterization implies that the subjective duration
elicited by presentation of a stimulus of duration t is a random
value sampled from the applicable distribution, regardless of the
psychophysical task or the occasion that motivated the presen-
tation of such stimulus. In semi-objective psychophysical tasks,
observers are assumed to make a decision and respond accord-
ing to the values drawn for each of the stimuli presented in each
trial. Modeling performance on these tasks thus calls for a deci-
sion rule specifying how observers use the current sample (or
samples) of subjective duration to make a judgment and give a
response. This decisional component must vary across tasks but
its elements must be consistent in the sense that the decision rule
for some task cannot imply aspects or processes that are explic-
itly regarded as inexistent or impossible under alternative tasks.
FIGURE 3 | Distributions of subjective duration at selected values of
objective duration. The mean of each distribution is given by Equation (1)
with the same parameter values used in the bottom panel of Figure 1 (the
partly-occluded thick curve on the plane surface shows this psychophysical
function). The distributions obey the scalar property in Equation (2) with
γ = 0.15.
This is a reasonable demand on consideration that trials from
different tasks can be interwoven in a session, with the response
requested on each trial withheld until after stimulus presentation.
In such conditions, duration(s) must be internally represented
before observers know which decision rule must be used to give
a response. Empirical evidence shows that the operation of the
stimulus-dependent component precedes and is unaffected by the
task-dependent decisional component (Schneider and Komlos,
2008; García-Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana, 2012; García-Pérez and
Peli, 2014). On the same grounds, one must assume that μi
and σi do not vary across tasks when stimuli and conditions are
invariant.
Sections Single-Presentation Methods and Paired-
Comparison Methods describe the model (timing output
and decision rule) describing performance on the most com-
mon semi-objective psychophysical tasks, also discussing other
assumptions needed to interpret the data.
SINGLE-PRESENTATION METHODS
In single-presentation methods, observers are shown a sin-
gle stimulus on each trial for them to report a categorical
judgment. Making this judgment nevertheless requires that the
internal representation of the current stimulus is judged rela-
tive to what has sometimes been called an internal standard.
The two methods described next differ as to how the internal
standard is instated and what type of categorical judgment is
requested.
THE TEMPORAL GENERALIZATION TASK
The temporal generalization task consists of a training phase and
a test phase. In the training phase, observers are repeatedly shown
instances of an exemplar duration tst designated as the standard.
The test phase comprises a series of trials each of which displays a
duration t around tst and asks observers to indicate whether that
duration was the same as tst. A plot of the proportion of “same”
responses as a function of test duration describes the empirical
psychometric function.
When both phases use the same stimulus and conditions are
identical, subjective duration must be governed by the same
μ and σ in both phases. Hence, the data are expected to
reveal that the test duration at which “same” responses are
maximally prevalent is t = tst. But stimuli or conditions may
differ across phases: The training phase may use a neutral
stimulus such as an oval while the test phase uses emotional
stimuli such as angry faces or taboo words. In such case, μ
and σ will differ across phases if subjective time runs differ-
ently in each condition. Let subscripts “s” and “t” respectively
denote the functions that apply to the standard and to the test.
Then, one would expect the data to disclose the test duration
whose subjective duration equals the subjective duration of the
standard. Formally, this is the value tPSE at which μt(tPSE) =
μs(tst).
Fitting model-based psychometric functions to the data is use-
ful for these purposes. Formal models from which theoretical
psychometric functions for the temporal generalization task can
be derived were first proposed by Church and Gibbon (1982)
andWearden (1992). The model described next differs from these
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in minor respects discussed in section Differences with Previous
Models.
Model and assumptions
The training phase helps observers to set an anchor point (inter-
nal standard) from the sample of subjective durations elicited
by repeated presentation of the standard. The anchor is presum-
ably placed at Sst = μs(tst) and kept invariant. In the test phase,
observers compare the random subjective duration S elicited by
the current test with Sst and respond according to the magnitude
of |S − Sst|. Observers are assumed to have a limited resolu-
tion to tell small differences from zero, for otherwise they would
always respond “different.” Under these assumptions, the deci-
sion rule states that observers respond “same” when |S − Sst| ≤
δ and “different” when |S − Sst| > δ, where δ is the resolution
limit and the interval from Sst − δ to Sst + δ is the indifference
region.
The mathematical form of the psychometric function for
“same” responses is easily derived from these assumptions. Given
that Sst = μ(tst) is assumed constant and that S in the test phase
is normally distributed with mean μt(t) and standard deviation
σt(t), the probability same of a “same” response varies with test
duration t as
same(t) = Prob (|S − Sst| ≤ δ)
= Prob (Sst − δ ≤ S ≤ Sst + δ)
= 
(









where is the unit-normal cumulative distribution function. The
psychophysical function μ is thus embedded in the psychometric
function, as is the scalar property. Figure 4A shows the psychome-
tric function when μs = μt ≡ μ and σs = σt ≡ σ (see the legend
for parameter values) so that Equation (3) becomes
same(t) = 
(









Even in these conditions, same does not peak at the standard
duration because t = tst maximizes Equation (4) only when σ(t)
is a constant function independent of t. When σ(t) obeys the
FIGURE 4 | Model-based psychometric functions for the temporal
generalization task. In (A), perception of duration is governed by the same
psychophysical function for training and test stimuli; in (B), they are governed by
different psychophysical functions. The top panel shows a continuous version
of the surface for which cross-sectional plots at selected t were shown in
Figure 3. The surface in (A) has the same parameters as in Figure 3 and
governs perception of duration for the training stimulus in both columns and
also for the test stimulus in (A); the surface in (B) only differs in that α = 5.4
instead and is assumed to govern perception of duration of the test stimulus in
(B). The middle panel shows the partition of decision space into a central gray
region of subjective durations that result in “same” responses and two outer
white regions of subjective durations that result in “different” responses. The
central gray region spans δ = 150 units on either side of the anchor point. The
bottom panel shows the resultant psychometric function in Equation (3). The
ordinate at each value of t equals the area under the cross-section at t of the
surface in the top panel within the region that results in “same” responses.
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scalar property, Equation (4) peaks at t =
√
1+ 4γ2 − 1
2γ2
Sst. The
right-hand side of this expression evaluates to 0.99Sst when γ =
0.1 and to 0.92Sst when γ = 0.3, but the spacing used in empiri-
cal studies (typically 100–200ms) is too coarse to reveal this shift.
If differences in stimuli or conditions across training and test
phases affect subjective time, same is further shifted because the
peak of Equation (3) is further away from t = tst when μs = μt
(see Figure 4B). Note also that differences between σs and σt are
inconsequential, as σs plays no role in same. The gradients on
either side of same are determined by how σt varies with t. With
scalar variance, same is positively skewed. The skew is further
emphasized when μt is a concave function (βt < 1 in Equation 1)
and reduced or even reversed whenμt is convex (compare the two
curves in Figure 2A).
Because same does not peak at t = tst even when μs = μt,
observed shifts of same away from tst cannot be interpreted as
evidence that μs = μt and, thus, of differences in subjective time
in the conditions of the test phase relative to the training phase.
Other difficulties in the interpretation of data from the tempo-
ral generalization task will be discussed in section Summary and
Discussion of Single-Presentation Methods.
Differences with previous models
Wearden (1992) proposed three variants of the model of Church
and Gibbon (1982), which are discussed next in our notation.
All variants share two characteristics: (1) subjective duration is
assumed accurate on average so that the psychophysical func-
tion is μ(t) = t in all cases and (2) the internal standard is not
regarded as a fixed value but as a random variable with mean tst.
Also, the resolution parameter (called threshold by Wearden) is
fixed at δ in some variants but regarded as random with mean δ
in others. All three variants use a decision rule analogous to that in
section Model and Assumptions and they differ as to the assumed
variances of subjective duration, internal standard, and threshold
(when random).
The modified-Church-and-Gibbon (MCG) model assumes
σ(t) = 0. Thus, subjective duration is not a random variable and,
given μ(t) = t, it is identical to objective duration. This model
places the scalar property at the internal standard (drawn in each
trial from the memory representation of the standard) whereas
the threshold is regarded as a random variable with fixed vari-
ance. The MCG model is structurally equivalent to our model
because the distribution of |X − Y | is the same regardless of which
of X or Y is the random variable and which is the constant and
also because the variability of δ can be formally transferred to the
internal standard. But this model presents an empirical difficulty:
If subjective duration equals objective duration (a consequence
of assuming μ(t) = t and σ(t) = 0), observers would be perfectly
accurate in paired-comparison tasks asking them to judge the rel-
ative durations of two stimuli displayed in each trial (see section
Paired-Comparison Methods).
The fixed-threshold model removes the variability of δ while
leaving other assumptions of the MCG model intact. This model
is also formally equivalent to our model and to the MCG model,
and results reported byWearden (1992; see his Table 1) reveal that
the estimated variability of the internal standard increases under
this model to capture the variability attributed to threshold under
the MCG model. Finally, the timing-variability model assumes
scalar variance for subjective duration in place of σ(t) = 0, also
assuming scalar variance with the same γ for the internal standard
and a threshold randomly drawn in each trial from a distribu-
tion with fixed variance. Structurally, this model is not equivalent
to the others because it involves a ratio of independent nor-
mal random variables, whose distribution is not normal (Simon,
2002, formula 7.7). The model nevertheless produces nearly iden-
tical psychometric functions and is also functionally equivalent
to the previous two and to our model, although scalar variance
affects two random variables here and must result in smaller
estimates of γ to account for the same data (see Table 1 in
Wearden, 1992).
Because all the models of Wearden (1992) use μ(t) = t, they
explicitly assume that subjective and objective time run identi-
cally and, hence, the models are incompatible with the notion
that subjective time may run at a different pace, or with an inter-
est in assessing what that pace may be and how it varies across
conditions. Fitting these models to empirical data enforces the
assumption of veridical time perception and succeeding at that
shows that temporal generalization data are compatible with the
notion that subjective time is equivalent to objective time. This
outcome is not to be taken as a proof that time perception is
never distorted relative to objective time but as a manifestation
of non-identifiability issues hampering the interpretation of data,
whose discussion is deferred to section Summary and Discussion
of Single-Presentation Methods.
THE TEMPORAL BISECTION TASK
The temporal bisection task also consists of a training phase and
a test phase. In the training phase, observers are shown repeated
instances of exemplar durations tshort and tlong designated short
and long, respectively. The test phase comprises trials displaying
a test duration t typically between tshort and tlong. Observers are
asked to judge whether the current test duration is closer to the
short or to the long exemplars. A plot of the proportion of “long”
responses at each test duration describes the empirical psycho-
metric function and the 50% point on this function is taken to be
the BP.
Performance is governed by common μ and σ if stimuli and
conditions do not differ across phases. The BP might then be
expected to lie at the midpoint between tshort and tlong only if
μ is linear (Figure 1A and the blue curve in Figure 2B). With
non-linear μ, the objective midpoint does not map onto the sub-
jective midpoint (Figure 1B) and the BP would be expected to lie
at the test duration associated with the subjective midpoint (red
curve in Figure 2B). Note that the two cases in Figure 2B reflect
an exquisite ability to bisect the subjective continuum; the differ-
ent BPs simply reflect the form of μ. Bisection tasks are also used
with different stimuli or conditions in the training and test phases
so that μt may differ from μs and σt may differ from σs (using the
same notation as before). In such cases, one expects the BP to
identify the test duration that is subjectively midway between the
subjective durations of the short and long standards.
Quite often, cumulative Gaussian or logistic functions are fit-
ted to data to estimate the BP and the DL from location and slope
parameters. Formal models from which suitable psychometric
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functions can be derived were first proposed by Gibbon (1981)
and Wearden (1991a; see also Wearden and Ferrara, 1995). The
model described next differs from these in some respects dis-
cussed in section Differences with Previous Models.
Model and assumptions
The training phase helps observers to set anchor points from the
sample of subjective durations elicited by repeated presentation
of short and long exemplars. In principle, the anchor points are
assumed to be placed at Ss = μs(tshort) and Sl = μs(tlong) and
also to be invariant. In the test phase, observers compare the
subjective duration S of the current stimulus with Ss and Sl and
respond according to which of |S − Ss| or | S − Sl| is the small-
est. In principle, “long” responses are in order when |S − Sl| <
|S − Ss|, which simplifies to S > (Ss + Sl)/2. For all purposes, this
is as if observers set a single anchor at the subjective midpoint
Smp = (Ss + Sl)/2. Assuming that observers use a point criterion
and always classify S as closer to the short or the long exemplars
is incompatible with assumptions in the model for temporal gen-
eralization: If observers can use a point criterion in the bisection
task to decide whether S is above or below Smp, they should show
the same capability in the temporal generalization task for decid-
ing whether S is above or below Sst, and thus they would always
respond “different.” Observers surely have limited resolution also
in the bisection task so that they respond “short” when S < Smp
− δ, respond “long” when S > Smp + δ, and cannot tell when
Smp − δ ≤ S ≤ Smp + δ, also involving a resolution limit and an
indifference region. But, because observers are forced to respond
“short” or “long,” they must use an extra criterion when they
cannot tell. The model assumes that they respond “long” with
probability ξ, reflecting their response bias and regardless of the
criteria that render such outcome.
The psychometric function long for “long” responses is easily
derived from these assumptions. Since Smp is assumed constant
and S in the test phase is normally distributed with mean μt(t)
and standard deviation σt(t), the probability of a “long” response
varies with test duration t as
long(t) = Prob
(
S > Smp + δ

















Smp − δ − μt(t)
σt(t)
)]
= 1 − ξ
(
Smp − δ − μt(t)
σt(t)
)
− (1 − ξ)
(




Figure 5A shows sample psychometric functions when μs =
μt = μ and σs = σt = σ for several values of the response bias
parameter ξ. It is noteworthy that the location of the 50% point
on long varies greatly with ξ. In principle, only when μs and
μt are linear does tmp map onto Smp (Figure 1). But, even when
they are linear, long has its 50% point at tmp only when ξ =
0.5 (blue curve in Figure 2B). It is also noteworthy that the
location and slope of long are greatly affected by the irrele-
vant response bias and resolution parameters ξ and δ (compare
FIGURE 5 | Model-based psychometric functions for the temporal
bisection task. Panels (A,B) reflect the same scenarios as in Figure 4
regarding psychophysical functions (identified in the top panels here as
dashed and solid curves instead of red and blue curves). The top panel
shows a decision space analogously partitioned (now using δ = 70) but the
regions now result in “short,” “I can’t tell,” and “long” judgments although
“I can’t tell” judgments must still be reported as “short” or “long”
responses. The bottom panel shows the psychometric functions (from
Equation 5) that may result according to how observers respond when
undecided. The blue curve arises when “I can’t tell” judgments are always
reported as “long” responses (blue arrow in the top panel; ξ = 1 in
Equation 5); the red curve arises when “I can’t tell” judgments are always
reported as “short” responses (red arrow in the top panel; ξ = 0 in
Equation 5); the black curve arises when “I can’t tell” judgments are
reported as “short” or “long” responses with equiprobability
(double-headed black arrow in the top panel; ξ = 0.5 in Equation 5); the
dashed curve arises if δ = 0 so that observers use a point criterion at the
subjective midpoint and are never undecided.
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with the dashed black curve for δ = 0 in the bottom panel of
Figure 5A), undermining interpretation of the BP and the DL.
If differences in stimuli or conditions across training and test
phases affect subjective time, long is further shifted (Figure 5B)
although given the influence of response bias, the 50% on long
carries no information that can be readily interpreted in terms of
the pace of subjective time. As in temporal generalization, differ-
ences between σs and σt are inconsequential as σs plays no role in
long. As resolution decreases (i.e., δ increases) with fixed ξ,long
becomes shallower (compare the dashed and solid black curves in
the bottom panels of Figure 5). Finally, long is not symmetric
about its 50% point: Its left side rises more sharply than its right
side levels off. This is due to the scalar property (for a discussion
of this issue, see Killeen et al., 1997).
It is worth mentioning a mixed task in which a standard is
used in the training phase (as in temporal generalization) and
observers report whether the current test duration is longer or
shorter than the standard (as in temporal bisection). In such case
(Grondin and Rammsayer, 2003), observers do not need to build
Smp from Ss and Sl in the training phase but build Sst directly
and use it in the test phase. The model psychometric function is
still given by Equation (5) with Sst in place of Smp. Another vari-
ant of the bisection task is the “partition bisection” of Wearden
and Ferrara (1995), in which the training phase is omitted and
observers are simply asked to classify test stimuli as “short” or
“long” using whichever criterion they wish. The psychometric
function is again given by Equation (5), except that Smp is a free
parameter that captures the arbitrary criterion used by observers.
In yet a further variant, observers receive feedback relative to the
objective midpoint of the range of test durations (Grondin, 1998),
which should help them to set a stable criterion.
Differences with previous models
The seminal model of Gibbon (1981) is analogous to the model
just described except that he omitted the indifference region. His
model thus arises by setting δ = 0 to revert to a point criterion.
Gibbon analyzed versions of the model in which μ is non-linear
and σ obeys the scalar property so that estimated model parame-
ters speak of the pace at which subjective time runs. In addition,
he considered the implications of decision rules involving point
criteria other than Smp = (Ss + Sl)/2.
Wearden (1991a) adapted his fixed-threshold model of tempo-
ral generalization for application to bisection tasks, thus including
the indifference region missing in Gibbon’s (1981) model. In
this model, observers draw random memories of the long and
the short durations (both of which are accurate on average and
have scalar variance) to compare them with the exactly perceived
test duration (i.e., μ(t) = t and σ(t) = 0), responding “long” or
“short” according to which distance is the smallest but provided
that the difference of distances is beyond a fixed threshold (res-
olution limit). On trials in which the threshold is not exceeded,
observers are undecided and always respond “long.” This model
is formally equivalent to our model in Equation (5) with ξ = 1,
μt(t) = t, and σt(t) reflecting instead the variability of the mem-
ory representations. Wearden and Ferrara (1995) later made two
amendments to this model: Undecided observers respond “short”
or “long” with equiprobability (ξ = 0.5) and the anchor Smp is
randomly drawn in each trial from a distribution whose mean
equals the average of the set of test durations. This is the only
random variable in the model but Wearden and Ferrara’s (1995)
writing is unclear about whether its standard deviation was fixed
or increased with t so as to incorporate the scalar property.
By embedding the assumption that μ(t) = t, these models are
unsuitable for assessing how subjective time runs compared to
objective time. A 50% point found to be away from tmp is implic-
itly attributed to response bias or to a criterion Smp placed away
from μs(tmp) = tmp (for an amendment of the model in this
respect, see Wearden, 2004). Such decisional or response aspects
are unrelated to time perception, which is regarded as accurate
under these models. The same holds for the model of Killeen et al.
(1997), which also assumes μ(t) = t and the scalar property but
uses a logistic function as an approximation to .
Kopec and Brody (2010) presented a model of an entirely
different nature for the bisection task. This model is not consid-
ered here because it involves assumptions, processes, and decision
rules that are specific to bisection tasks and cannot describe
performance in any other task. For instance, applied to a tempo-
ral generalization task, the model posits that same should have
a symmetric Gaussian shape peaking at t = tst and such that
same(tst) = 1.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF SINGLE-PRESENTATION METHODS
Psychometric functions describing performance in single-
presentation methods embed a representation of subjective dura-
tion (the functions μ and σ) and decisional aspects pertaining
to how judgments are made and reported (the anchor points Sst
or Smp, the observers’ resolution δ and, where applicable, their
response bias ξ). All of these components affect the psychome-
tric function, including its location and slope. With reasonable
assumptions about these components, Figures 4, 5 showed that
neither the empirical location of the peak of same and its gradi-
ent on either side nor the empirical location of the 50% point on
long and its slope can be interpreted as pure indices of timing
processes. But the interpretation of data is further complicated if
three other implicit assumptions of single-presentation methods
are violated.
The first assumption is that the indifference region is sym-
metric about the anchor point. In general, boundaries might be
placed at Sst − δ1 and Sst + δ2 in the temporal generalization
task (or at Smp − δ1 and Smp + δ2 in the bisection task), with
symmetry occurring when δ1 = δ2 = δ. The effects of an asym-
metric region are illustrated in Figure 6: Psychometric functions
shift as a result of this decisional bias. Obtaining direct evidence
of the symmetry of the indifference region is impossible with
single-presentation data, but methods allowing this determina-
tion exist and their use has revealed that the indifference region is
generally asymmetric (García-Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana, 2013;
García-Pérez and Peli, 2014).
The second assumption is that the anchor points Sst and Smp
are respectively placed at μs(tst) and at (μs(tshort) + μs(tlong))/2
during the training phase, as if observers used the arithmetic
mean of a large sample of subjective durations elicited by repeated
presentation of the standard (or the short and long exemplars). If
the anchor were placed elsewhere during the training phase, the
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FIGURE 6 | Effects of decisional bias in the temporal generalization (A)
and temporal bisection (B) tasks. Graphical conventions as in
Figures 4, 5. Decisional bias shows in that the central region for “same”
or “I can’t tell” judgments is displaced upwards by 30 units relative to its
location in Figure 4 or 5. Psychometric functions are accordingly shifted
laterally to the right.
decision criterion during the test phase would not be at its pre-
sumed location and same (or long) would shift accordingly. In
these conditions, shifts of the psychometric function do not nec-
essarily reflect differences in subjective time across training and
test phases even if μs(t) = μt(t) = t. Obtaining evidence as to
where the anchor point was placed seems impossible.
The third assumption is that anchors presumably placed
at Sst = μs(tst) or Smp = (μs(tshort) + μs(tlong))/2 are stable. If
they drifted systematically during the test phase, aggregating
data across the session would shift the psychometric function.
Concerns that anchor drift may occur come from adaptation level
theory (Helson, 1948), which posits that the set of durations used
during the test phase defines a context that relocates the inter-
nal standard. Stimulus range effects on temporal generalization
do not seem to have been studied in a way that allows determin-
ing observable consequences on the location of same, but these
effects have been reported for the bisection task (Wearden and
Ferrara, 1995, 1996; Penney et al., 2014). The model of Wearden
and Ferrara (1995) assumes that, as a result of this, the anchor
is placed at the arithmetic mean of the set of test durations (or
at 95% of this value; see Wearden, 2004). But the dynamics of
the underlying processes are unknown, which precludes devising
ways to eliminate or compensate for their effects so that bisection
data are not contaminated by criterion placement.
These difficulties undermine the interpretation of temporal
generalization and bisection data even under identical condi-
tions in the training and test phases. Consider the bisection
results reported by Gil et al. (2009). The training phase used
a picture of an oval with tshort = 400ms and tlong = 1600ms
so that tmp = 1000ms. Among conditions involving pictures of
liked and disliked foods, the test phase also included a condi-
tion with the oval picture. Averaged across observers, results with
the oval showed a remarkable shift: long had its 50% point
at t ≈ 800ms, with long(tmp) ≈ 0.8. Assuming μs = μt =
μ, σs = σt = σ, incorporating the scalar property, and remov-
ing the indifference region (i.e., δ = 0), Equation (5) reduces to
long(t) = (γ − Smp/σ(t)). If Smp = μ(tmp) and τ in Equation
(1) is removed, long(t) = (γ − tβmp/γtβ) obtains. Reproducing
the shape described by data from the oval condition in Gil et al.’s
Figure 2 with this function requires β ≈ 2.39 and γ ≈ 1.46, unrea-
sonable values compared to common estimates of β in μ and γ
in the scalar property. Data are nonetheless unquestionable and
a 50% point at t ≈ 800ms with long(tmp) ≈ 0.8 are empirical
facts. What is less clear is what the data say about the relation
of subjective to objective time, or whether time is under- or
over-estimated as opposed to veridically perceived. The same data
could have arisen if β = 1 (i.e.,μ(t) = t) and the assumption that
Smp = μ(tmp) is removed, implying that observers perceive dura-
tion veridically but for some reason they do not set the anchor
at μ(tmp) during the training phase (Raslear, 1985; Allan and
Gerhardt, 2001; Allan, 2002a,b). And the same shift could have
been caused also with μ(t) = t and by reinstating the assump-
tion that Smp = μ(tmp) if observers had a non-null indifference
region (i.e., δ = 0) and responded with bias when undecided
(Figure 5). Which scenario is responsible for the observed results
is indiscernible because all account for the data equally well.
It is remarkable that virtually all analyses of bisection data
have explicitly or implicitly assumed μt(t) = t and, hence, that
duration is accurately perceived. Yet, what should have thus been
regarded as criterion shifts or response bias has been inconsis-
tently interpreted as evidence of differences in perceived duration.
To see that the assumption of veridical time perception is implicit
when two-parameter psychometric functions are fitted to bisec-
tion data, make δ = 0 (i.e., a point criterion), μt(t) = t (i.e.,
veridical time perception), and σt(t) = k (i.e., remove the scalar
property). In these conditions, Equation (5) becomes long(t) =
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((t − Smp)/k), which is the widespread cumulative Gaussian fit-
ted to bisection data and sometimes replaced for convenience
with a logistic function. On fitting this psychometric function to
data, Smp is regarded as a free parameter to account for observed
shifts with respect to tmp, but this is synonymous with observers
using an arbitrary criterion that varies across conditions (i.e., they
do not set Smp at tmp in all conditions) and perceived duration
being veridical and invariant across conditions (sinceμt(t) = t in
all cases).
Interpretation of bisection data is more difficult when the test
phase does not include a condition with the training stimulus.
Consider the results reported by Tipples (2010). Stimuli in the
training phase were eight-consonant strings with tshort = 400ms
and tlong = 1600ms so that tmp = 1000ms. The test phase used
words of six different types: high arousal negative or positive, low
arousal negative or positive, neutral, and sexual taboo. Since the
50% point on long was 30–40ms higher for taboo words than
for the other types of word, Tipples concluded that time flies
when one reads taboo words. Yet, and leaving other issues aside,
without a reference provided by the 50% point on the psychome-
tric function for eight-consonant strings, the 50% point on long
for test words is uninterpretable: The conclusion would have dif-
fered if the 50% point on long for eight-consonant strings were
above that for taboo words or below that for the other types of
word. Tipple’s conclusion is even more puzzling on consideration
that, on average across observers, the 50% point lay between 955
and 970ms for non-taboo words and nearly at 1000ms for taboo
words (see his Figure 2). Since tmp = 1000ms, the conventional
(though unwarranted) conclusion should have been that time is
perceived accurately only with taboo words.
These considerations apply also to the temporal generalization
task, although studies assessing if time flies or slows down under
certain conditions have almost exclusively used the bisection task.
Measuring the psychometric function (be it long or same) for
training stimuli sets a reference for comparison with the psycho-
metric function for other types of stimuli, but this does not solve
the problems of single-presentation methods. The multiplicity of
factors that can shift the psychometric function away from tmp
(or tst) preclude the interpretation of observed shifts as evidence
of differences in subjective time across conditions. Bisection tasks
are more seriously affected by this problem because response bias
further alters the slope of the psychometric function (Figure 5)
and contaminates DL estimates.
One might think that these problems would be solved by fit-
ting psychometric functions such as those in Equations (3) or
(5) to the data. Replacing the assumption of symmetry built into
them (i.e., using δ1 and δ2 as needed instead of the single δ in
them) puts into the fitted function all the factors that contribute
to observed performance. Estimated parameter values would thus
provide all the information needed for a proper interpretation
of the data. With a psychophysical function given by Equation
(1), estimates of the exponent β would directly indicate how
time runs in each experimental condition provided the condi-
tion used to set the anchors is also tested. Unfortunately, models
for single-presentation tasks are non-identifiable: There are infi-
nite sets of parameter values that produce the same psychometric
function (Yarrow et al., 2011; García-Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana,
2013; García-Pérez and Peli, 2014). This is not a problem of the
models, but an indication that the intervening factors are inextri-
cably confounded in single-presentation data. Data gathered with
single-presentation methods are simply uninterpretable. Luckily,
paired-comparison methods offer a suitable and dependable
alternative with which these influences can be separated out.
PAIRED-COMPARISON METHODS
Trials in paired-comparison methods display two stimuli (a stan-
dard and a test, both of whichmay vary across trials) for observers
to make a comparative judgment. Single-presentation methods
imply a comparison too, but with respect to an internal stan-
dard. In paired-comparison tasks, the standard is explicit and
subject to the same type of processing as is the test. A train-
ing phase is not needed to instate an internal standard, nor are
assumptions about its placement and stability. Some modifica-
tions of the temporal generalization and bisection tasks turn them
into paired-comparison methods, and the models discussed here
apply to them too. For instance, the roving standard task of Allan
and Gerhardt (2001) or Rodríguez-Gironés and Kacelnik (2001)
presents in each trial a short and a long exemplar (which vary
across trials) so that observers compare the test duration with
the current exemplars. Similarly, the episodic temporal generaliza-
tion task of Wearden and Bray (2001) presents a variable standard
in each trial which is the reference for the observers’ current
judgment.
In paired-comparison trials, standard and test elicit subjective
durations from the applicable distributions and observers judge
by comparing the values drawn in the current trial. Observers can
be asked to report whether both stimuli have the same subjec-
tive duration (the equality task), whether the first or the second
appeared to have a longer duration (the comparative task), or
whether the first, the second, or neither was subjectively longer
than the other (the ternary task, which blends the two other tasks).
[Incidentally, the bisection task can also be administered in a
ternary format (Droit-Volet and Izaute, 2009) and its application
reveals an indifference region whose width and symmetry differs
across observers (García-Pérez and Peli, 2014).] The outcome of
the timing component of a psychophysical model of performance
in paired-comparison tasks cannot vary with the question asked
at the end of the trial, as discussed in section A Unified Model
of Performance across Semi-Objective Psychophysical Tasks. The
next section describes the model for paired-comparison tasks,
including a common timing outcome and a decision rule that
varies with the task.
THE MODEL FOR PAIRED-COMPARISON JUDGMENTS
The model is analogous to an indecision model derived from
SDT for use in other psychophysical tasks (García-Pérez and
Alcalá-Quintana, 2010a,b, 2011a,b, 2013; Alcalá-Quintana and
García-Pérez, 2011; García-Pérez and Peli, 2014). Its relation
to other models will be discussed in section Differences with
Previous Models. In the general case when standard and test dif-
fer qualitatively (as might be when test and standard are, e.g.,
eight-consonant strings vs. taboo words, or pictures of an oval
vs. pictures of liked foods), the subjective duration Sst of a stan-
dard duration tst is normally distributed with mean μs(tst) and
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standard deviation σs(tst) whereas the subjective duration St of a
test duration t is normally distributed with mean μt(t) and stan-
dard deviation σt(t). Sample psychophysical functions that differ
across test and standard stimuli are shown in the two right pan-
els of Figure 7A. When standard and test stimuli are the same or
when their differences do not affect subjective duration, μs = μt
and σs = σt (two left panels of Figure 7A). Our goal here is to
derive the psychometric function relative to a standard of fixed
duration tst across trials, whether or not such trials are interwo-
ven with trials for other standards (which will define separate
psychometric functions).
The model assumes that Sst and St are independent from
one another and that observers’ judgments are based on the
magnitude of a decision variable D = S2 − S1 computed from
the subjective durations of the second and first stimuli in the
current trial. (The direction in which the difference is computed is
FIGURE 7 | Model-based psychometric functions for paired-comparison
tasks in four different scenarios. (A) Psychophysical functionsμs (light green)
and μt (dark green). In the two columns on the left, μs = μt with αs = αt = 5,
βs = βt = 0.75, and τs = τt = −10 in Equation (1); in the two columns on the
right μs is as before but parameters of μt are αt = 5.4, βt = 0.75, and τt = −10.
Scalar variance is assumed with γs = 0.15 in all cases and γt = 0.15 also in the
two left columns but γt = 0.10 in the two right columns. Light and dark green
lines show in each scenario the mapping of the standard at tst = 700ms and a
sample test at t = 600ms. (B) Distribution of the decision variable for the
standard-test pair just mentioned in a trial in which the test is presented first.
The distribution is narrower in the two columns on the right due to the smaller
variance. The decision space is partitioned into three regions by vertical lines at
D = δ1 and D = δ2, with δ1 = −150 and δ2 = 150 in the first and third columns
(i.e., no decisional bias) but δ1 = −70 and δ2 = 230 in the second and fourth
columns (i.e., decisional bias). Each region is associated with the judgment
indicated at the top, and the probability of the corresponding judgment equals
the area under the distribution in that region. (C)Distributions in a trial involving
the same pair but with the test presented in the second interval. (D)
Psychometric functions in the ternary task for each presentation order. Color
codes relate to (B,C) (e.g., dark blue denotes “interval 1” responses when the
testwaspresentedfirst; palebluedenotes“interval 2” responseswhen the test
was presented second). A thin vertical line indicates the true location of the PSE
defined as tPSE = μ−1t (μs(tst)). With parameters given above, tPSE = 700ms in
the two columns on the left whereas tPSE = 630.8ms in the two columns on
the right. (E) Psychometric functions for “test longer” responses in the
comparative task for each presentation order and with response bias ranging
from ξ = 0.5 (paler curves) through ξ = 0.75, to ξ = 1 (darker curves). The
location of the true PSE is also indicated in each panel by a thin vertical line.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 415 | 11
García-Pérez Does time ever fly?
immaterial, as will become evident below.) Because test and stan-
dard can (and should) be presented in either order with equal
frequency across trials, each presentation order must be consid-
ered separately. Thus, on trials in which the test is presented first,
D = Sst − St is normally distributed with mean μs(tst) − μt(t);
on trials in which the test is presented second, D = St − Sst is
also normally distributed but with mean μt(t) − μs(tst). In both
cases the variance of D is the sum of the variances of Sst and St.
Figures 7B,C show the distributions of D for each presentation
order on a trial with t = 600ms when tst = 700ms, given the
psychophysical functions in Figure 7A. Limited resolution also
prevents observers from using a point criterion and the decision
space is partitioned into three regions separated by boundaries
δ1 and δ2, which are symmetric about D = 0 when δ1 = −δ2
(first and third panels in Figures 7B,C) and otherwise reflect
a decisional bias (second and fourth panels in Figures 7B,C).
Judgments turn into responses in a way that varies with the
task.
Consider first a ternary task in which observers report whether
duration was subjectively longer in the first interval, in the sec-
ond, or in neither. Observers respond “interval 2” when D > δ2,
“interval 1” when D < δ1, and “I can’t tell” when δ1 ≤ D ≤ δ2
(see labels in the top part of Figures 7B,C). Response probabil-
ities vary with presentation order due to the different mean of
D in each case. Specifically, the probability i of an “interval i”
response when the test is presented in interval i, with i ∈ {1, 2},
varies with t as
1(t) = Prob (Sst − St < δ1) = 
⎛
⎝ δ1 − μs (tst) + μt(t)√
σ2s (tst) + σ2t (t)
⎞
⎠ (6a)
2(t) = Prob (St − Sst > δ2) = 1 − 
⎛
⎝ δ2 − μt(t) + μs (tst)√
σ2s (tst) + σ2t (t)
⎞
⎠, (6b)
the probability ϒi of an “I can’t tell” response when the test is
presented in interval i varies with t as
ϒ1(t) = Prob (δ1 ≤ Sst − St ≤ δ2) = 
⎛
⎝ δ2 − μs (tst) + μt(t)√





⎝ δ1 − μs (tst) + μt(t)√
σ2s (tst) + σ2t (t)
⎞
⎠ (7a)
ϒ2(t) = Prob (δ1 ≤ St − Sst ≤ δ2) = 
⎛
⎝ δ2 − μt(t) + μs (tst)√





⎝ δ1 − μt(t) + μs (tst)√
σ2s (tst) + σ2t (t)
⎞
⎠ , (7b)
and the probability of responding as the interval in which
the standard was presented is 1 − i − ϒi. Figure 7D plots
psychometric functions in each scenario and their features are
discussed next.
The most conspicuous aspect is that psychometric functions
do not differ across presentation orders in the absence of deci-
sional bias (first and third columns in Figure 7) and they differ
otherwise (second and fourth columns in Figure 7). Differences
(or lack thereof) in the psychophysical functions for standard and
test also have observable effects. Consider the PSE as a proxy to
these differences. By definition, the PSE is the duration t that
the test must have for its subjective duration to equal the sub-
jective duration of the standard. Thus, the PSE is the duration
tPSE = μ−1t (μs(tst)) and its location is readily identifiable in the
psychometric functions. Consider the left column of Figure 7,
where δ1 = −δ2 and tPSE = tst because μs = μt. Here, 1 (blue
curve) crosses 1 − 2 − ϒ2 (pale red curve) at t = tst and
2 (red curve) also crosses 1 − 1 − ϒ1 (pale blue curve) at
that point. It can be easily seen from Equations (6) to (7) that
these crossings occur under any conditions at the duration t sat-
isfying μt(t) = μs(tst). In contrast, ϒ1 and ϒ2 (black and gray
curves) peak below t = tst due to the scalar property. Hence, “I
can’t tell” responses are not maximally prevalent at the PSE and,
thus, it is not the location of the peak of ϒ1 or ϒ2 that signals
the PSE.
With decisional bias under the same conditions (second col-
umn in Figure 7), psychometric functions differ across presenta-
tion orders but the PSE is identically encoded because the crossing
property holds always. In contrast to the preceding case, whereϒ1
and ϒ2 superimpose, their crossing here also occurs at the PSE. It
can again be easily seen from Equations (7) that ϒ1(t) = ϒ2(t)
at all t when δ1 = −δ2 (the conditions in the first column of
Figure 7) and that they cross at the duration t satisfying μt(t) =
μs(tst) when δ1 = −δ2 (the conditions in the second column of
Figure 7). The third and fourth columns in Figure 7 show that
identification of the PSE is also not hampered when μs = μt and
σs = σt, as would occur when subjective time runs differently for
test and standard. In the absence of decisional bias (third col-
umn), the crossing occurs at t = μ−1t (μs(tst)) = 630.8ms (thin
vertical line); with decisional bias (fourth column), the crossings
still occur at the same location. In sum, in the ternary paired-
comparison task, the effects of decisional bias are not confounded
with those of psychophysical functions that differ for standard
and test. In this task, the “I can’t tell” option also eliminates
the contaminating influence of response bias because observers
are not forced to give uninformative “interval 1” or “interval 2”
responses when undecided.
The equality task, where observers report whether or not
the two durations are subjectively equal, renders analogous
outcomes. Observers respond “same” when they would have
responded “I can’t tell” in the ternary task whereas they respond
“different” when they would have responded “interval 1” or
“interval 2.” The psychometric functions in Equations (7) hold
for the equality task, and the preceding discussion applies also to
this task. It should be noted that the PSE is not identifiable by
eye in ϒ1 and ϒ2 in the absence of decisional bias (i.e., when
δ1 = −δ2 and the functions superimpose). This is not a prob-
lem, as will be discussed in section Summary and Discussion of
Paired-Comparison Methods.
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In contrast, the comparative task in which observers are
forced to respond “interval 1” or “interval 2” calls again for a
response bias parameter ξ describing how observers give arbitrary
responses when they cannot tell which duration was longer. It
should be clear by now that this can only bring complications.
Assume that, as a result of response bias, observers respond
“interval 2” with probability ξ when they cannot tell. In this task,
“interval i” responses are translated as “test longer” when the
test had been presented in interval i. The probability i of “test
longer” responses when the test was presented in interval i varies
with t as
1(t) = Prob(Sst − St < δ1) + (1 − ξ)Prob(δ1 ≤ Sst − St ≤ δ2)
= ξ
⎛
⎝δ1 − μs (tst) + μt(t)√
σ2s (tst) + σ2t (t)
⎞
⎠
+ (1 − ξ)
⎛
⎝δ2 − μs (tst) + μt(t)√
σ2s (tst) + σ2t (t)
⎞
⎠ (8a)
2(t) = Prob(St − Sst > δ2) + ξProb(δ1 ≤ St − Sst ≤ δ2)
= 1 − ξ
⎛
⎝δ1 − μt(t) + μs (tst)√





⎝δ2 − μt(t) + μs (tst)√
σ2s (tst) + σ2t (t)
⎞
⎠ . (8b)
These psychometric functions are plotted in Figure 7E for sam-
ple values of ξ in each of the same four scenarios. The PSE is still
defined with respect to the underlying psychophysical functions,
but Figure 7D shows that the 50% point on the psychometric
function does not relate to this definition. Consider again the
first column of Figure 7, in which psychophysical functions are
identical for test and standard and there is no decisional bias. The
psychometric functions are identical for both presentation orders
only when ξ = 0.5 (dashed curves) and their 50% point lies at
the true PSE in such case; as ξ increasingly exceeds 0.5, 1 (blue
curves) shifts progressively to the right whereas 2 (red curves)
shifts progressively to the left, with their 50% points symmet-
rically placed with respect to the PSE. Both functions also turn
progressively steeper in this transition and it is also clear that 1
and2 have different shapes (i.e., they do not differ by translation
only), which is another consequence of the scalar property. In the
third column of Figure 7, still without decisional bias but when
psychophysical functions differ for test and standard, the psy-
chometric functions are displaced laterally toward the true PSE,
maintaining the properties described above. Yet, with decisional
bias (second and fourth columns), lack of response bias (ξ = 0.5)
produces psychometric functions that also differ across presen-
tation orders, although 1 and 2 still have their 50% points
symmetrically placed around the true PSE.
Data from the comparative task are usually aggregated across
presentation orders, although this practice is unadvisable (Ulrich
and Vorberg, 2009). The resultant psychometric function is
then 2AFC(t) = (1(t) + 2(t))/2 and it is easy to see from
Equations (8) that the 50% point on 2AFC occurs at t =
μ−1t (μs(tst)). Thus, the average of the psychometric functions for
each presentation order has its 50% point at the PSE, a result
derived by Ulrich and Vorberg for the case in which μs = μt and
generalized by García-Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana (2010a, 2011b)
for the case in which μs = μt and tPSE = tst. Although data from
the comparative task are still useful for estimating the PSE, esti-
mation of the true DL from percent points on the psychometric
function is impossible due to the strong influence of response bias
on its slope.
DIFFERENCES WITH PREVIOUS MODELS
Models for paired-comparison tasks are used in many areas of
psychophysics. Almost all of them derive from SDT principles
and share structural characteristics with our model, except that
they do not include an indifference region (i.e., they assume
δ1 = δ2), nor are they adapted to ternary tasks. With δ1 = δ2 = 0,
Equations (8) become
1(t) = 2(t) = 
⎛
⎝ μt(t) − μs (tst)√
σ2s (tst) + σ2t (t)
⎞
⎠ . (9)
Such model does not seem to have been used in time perception.
Conventional practice fits instead cumulative Gaussian or logis-
tic functions to the data or, equivalently, fits straight lines to the
z-scores of observed proportions. This entails a model analogous
to (and with the same problems as) the model discussed in sec-
tion Summary and Discussion of Single-Presentation Methods
for bisection data. In the comparative task, the argument of the
sigmoidal function is also of the form (t − a)/b and the con-
sequences are identical: The free location parameter a replaces
μs(tst) in Equation (9) and allows the 50% point to be placed
as needed without connection to the subjective duration of the
standard; the free spread parameter b replaces the entire denom-
inator of the argument of  in Equation (9), thus removing
the scalar property; and replacement of μt(t) with t amounts
to assuming that subjective and objective time run identically.
Succeeding in fitting such sigmoidal function and observing dif-
ferences in estimated location parameters across conditions can
only be justifiably interpreted as criterion shifts.
In contrast, a model proposed by Rammsayer and Ulrich
(2001) does justice to the assumptions and goals of studies on
time perception. In their model, consideration of the statistics of
counting processes yielded a non-identity psychophysical func-
tion and subjective durations whose standard deviation increases
with t. The model was also developed for application to the
ternary task used to gather their empirical data. With appropriate
replacements for μ and σ, their model and the resultant psy-
chometric functions for the ternary task are identical to those in
Equations (7) and (8) above except that Rammsayer and Ulrich
set δ1 = −δ2 (i.e., no decisional bias). For unknown reasons, this
model was subsequently abandoned by their proponents, as was
the ternary task.
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Another model for the comparative task was proposed by
Dyjas et al. (2012). Again in comparison with our model, they
assumed no indifference region (i.e., δ1 = δ2 = 0), undistorted
time perception (i.e., μt(t) = μs(t) = t), non-scalar timing (i.e.,
σt(t) = σs(t) = σ, a constant), and a history component that
alters an “internal standard” in line with adaptation level the-
ory. The internal standard is updated on every trial as the convex
sum of its value on the previous trial and the subjective duration
of the first interval in the current trial. Such internal standards
can be described as normally distributed with mean μs(tst) = tst
and a standard deviation that varies with presentation order (see
expressions for their variances in Equations 12–13 and 15–16 of
Dyjas et al.). For simplicity, let σ1 and σ2 represent the equiva-
lent standard deviation of the internal standard when the test is
presented first or second. All of this turns Equations (8) into
i(t) = 
⎛
⎝ t − tst√
σ2i + σ2
⎞
⎠, i ∈ {1, 2}. (10)
We use the term “equivalent” because substituting the expression
for σ1 coming from Dyjas et al.’s (2012) Equation (16) into our
Equation (10) does not render the psychometric function in their
Equation (26). This is due to an additional term in the numera-
tor of the argument in the first line of their Equation (26), which
they transferred to the denominator in the second line. Also, the
standard deviation of the internal standard varies according to
whether the two presentation orders are blocked or randomly
interwoven (see also Dyjas and Ulrich, 2014). The use of “equiv-
alent” standard deviations permits our Equation (10) to cover
all applicable cases while facilitating verbal descriptions of their
model.
Participation of such internal standard was invoked to produce
different slopes for 1 and 2, something that is accomplished
by the different σi in Equation (10). The scalar property excluded
from Dyjas et al.’s model would have produced the same effect
(Figure 7E). Sincei in Equation (10) has its 50% point at t = tst
for all i while empirical data contradict this property, Dyjas et al.
fitted their model using a logistic version of Equation (10) with ai
(in place of tst) and bi (in place of
√
σ2i + σ2) as free parameters
subject to Ulrich and Vorberg’s (2009) constraint. Since μt(t) =
μs(t) = t is assumed, this implies that shifts of the psychometric
function away from tst are caused by criterion setting, not by dif-
ferences in perceived duration. In a variant of this model, Dyjas
and Ulrich (2014) displaced the point criterion to some arbitrary
δ (i.e., δ1 = δ2 = δ), which turns Equation (10) into
i(t) = 
⎛
⎝ t − tst − ( − 1)iδ√
σ2i + σ2
⎞
⎠ , i ∈ {1, 2}. (11)
The success of Equation (11) at fitting the empirical data of
Dyjas and Ulrich provides further support to the notion that
shifts of 1 and 2 can be attributed to criteria, not necessarily
reflecting differences in perceived duration (which are explicitly
excluded by their assumptions). Dyjas and Ulrich also presented
a version of their model for the equality task, for which they intro-
duced a potentially asymmetric indifference region. This renders
psychometric functions identical to our Equations (7) with the
amendments discussed above to include the participation of an
internal standard. Their model for the equality task is thus incom-
patible with their model for the comparative task, as the latter
assumes that observers never judge stimuli to have the same sub-
jective duration. Interestingly, Dyjas et al. (2012) had allowed
observers to hit a separate response key when they judged the two
presentations in a trial to have the same duration, but they did
not describe how those responses were treated and they presented
and analyzed data as if such responses had never been given. Dyjas
and Ulrich did not include this extra response option.
Dyjas and Ulrich also described a model including sensa-
tion weighting as implemented in the model of García-Pérez
and Alcalá-Quintana (2011a), but this model is not discussed
here because it is empirically indistinguishable from the internal
standard model.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF PAIRED-COMPARISON METHODS
The shape of psychometric functions for paired-comparison tasks
is determined by an embedded representation of subjective dura-
tion (μ and σ) and by aspects of the decision process. In contrast
to single-presentation methods, paired-comparison methods are
free of complications arising from untestable assumptions regard-
ing the placement and stability of anchors. An added value of
paired-comparison methods is that they lend themselves to a sep-
arate analysis of data for each presentation order (Figure 7), by
which the influence of criteria and decisional bias on observed
performance is separated from that of true differences in subjec-
tive duration (different μ for test and standard) or in its variance
(different σ for test and standard).
But these are only potential benefits. If data are analyzed by
fitting psychometric functions implying μ(t) = t in all cases, the
potential of paired-comparison methods is wasted: Differences in
observed performance across conditions can only be justifiably
attributed to different criterion settings. To harvest the bene-
fits, fitted psychometric functions must include a non-identity μ
whose parameters capture the relation of subjective to objective
time that best accounts for the data in each condition. The uni-
versally accepted scalar property should also be included in place
of the fixed-variance assumption of typical analyses. Using sub-
scripts for the parameters of μ and σ in Equations (1)–(2) (and
setting τ = 0 for simplicity), Equations (6) and (7) for the ternary
task become on substitution
1(t) = 
⎛





st + γ2t α2t t2βt
⎞
⎠ (12a)
2(t) = 1 − 
⎛















st + γ2t α2t t2βt
⎞
⎠
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−
⎛

























st + γ2t α2t t2βt
⎞
⎠ . (12d)
Equations (12c)–(12d) apply also to the equality task, and a sim-
ilar substitution in Equations (8) renders explicit functions for
the comparative task. It should be noted from Figure 7E that
response bias combined with a non-identity μ and the scalar
property act together to produce the Type A and Type B order
effects discussed by Ulrich and Vorberg (2009), which can thus
be accounted for without ad hoc assumptions involving internal
standards or sensation weighting.
Parameter estimates for these model-based psychometric
functions can be easily obtained withmaximum-likelihoodmeth-
ods. Technicalities are omitted here but empirical examples
involving other classes of psychophysical functions are available
(García-Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana, 2013; García-Pérez and Peli,
2014). Simulation studies have also shown that parameters can be
recovered from data collected with the usual numbers of trials in
empirical studies, but these results are too lengthy to be reported
here.
It is also worth noting that performance measures such as PSEs
or DLs can be computed from parameter estimates without ref-
erence to percent points on the psychometric functions. Indeed,
since model parameters refer to underlying processes common to
all tasks and not to aspects of the shape of the psychometric func-
tion for some task, PSEs and DLs can be computed according to
their theoretical definition. As shown earlier, the PSE defined as
tPSE = μ−1t (μs(tst)) can be obtained given the functional forms
of μs and μt and estimates of their parameters. The DL, on the
other hand, is usually computed as the distance between some
percent points on the psychometric function for the comparative
task. As seen in Figure 7E, the location of these points is greatly
affected by the width and location of the indifference region and
also by response bias. Ulrich and Vorberg (2009) proposed com-
puting a separate DL from the psychometric function for each
presentation order, but this practice also results in a description
of time perception that is contaminated by all the non-timing
processes that affect observed performance. Ultimately, compu-
tation of the DL seeks the durations satisfying, say, Prob(St >
Sst) = 0.25 and Prob(St > Sst) = 0.75. Since parameter estimates
give a full description of μ and σ for test and standard stim-
uli, uncontaminated estimates of the latent DL (García-Pérez and
Alcalá-Quintana, 2012, 2013) can easily be obtained by noting









st + γ2t α2t t2βtp
⎞
⎠ = p, (13)
an equation that can be directly solved from parameter estimates.
DLs and WRs thus computed are free of the contaminants that
affect the probability of observed responses, and they are also
independent of the task with which the data were collected.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND EVIDENCE-BASED
RECOMMENDATIONS
The pace of subjective time surely differs from that of objective
time, and different stimulus types or conditions surely alter the
pace of subjective time further. This means that the psychophys-
ical function μ describing the relation of subjective to objective
time cannot be the identity function and that its parameters
must vary across conditions. Yet, studies in which semi-objective
tasks have been used to assess differences in time perception
routinely fit psychometric functions implyingμ(t) = t in all con-
ditions, also including a location parameter allowed to vary across
conditions. If someone wanted to make the case that time per-
ception is always accurate and different conditions only make
observers set different response criteria, fitting such psychome-
tric functions would be the way to gather supporting evidence.
The success with which empirical data are accounted for with
that type of psychometric function has nevertheless been taken
as evidence of differences in perceived duration across con-
ditions. Although the theoretical underpinnings of the fitted
psychometric functions do not permit such interpretation, the
overwhelming success with which data have historically been
accounted for as if only criterion differences were involved can-
not be taken as ruling out differences in subjective time across
conditions. For a proper assessment of the various determinants
of observed performance, model-based psychometric functions
should be fitted to data to interpret the parameters describing
each of the influences that affect performance. But data should
also be collected using psychophysical tasks that allow separat-
ing out those influences. The following sections discuss what
the theoretical analyses presented in this paper say about these
issues.
PSYCHOPHYSICAL TASKS
The model presented in this paper renders psychometric func-
tions tailored to the characteristics of each semi-objective psy-
chophysical task. The functions μ and σ describing subjective
duration are always included in the psychometric functions and,
in principle, the parameters of μ and σ could be estimated
from data gathered with any task. But observed performance
is also affected by decisional and response processes that lend
additional parameters to the psychometric function, and not all
psychophysical tasks provide informative data for an estimation
of the parameters describing all of these influences. We showed
that all determinants of performance are inextricably confounded
in data gathered with single-presentationmethods, which are thus
unsuitable for assessing time perception (or any other perceptual
process; see García-Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana, 2013). The use of
single-presentation methods should be discontinued.
Paired-comparison methods, on the other hand, provide data
from which these influences can be separated out, allowing
a proper assessment of each of the determinants of perfor-
mance. Of the various formats that paired-comparison methods
may take, the ternary task is best suited for these purposes.
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It should be noted that any study conducted with a single-
presentation method can also be conducted with the ternary
paired-comparison task. Consider the studies of Gil et al. (2009)
or Tipples (2010) discussed in section Summary and Discussion
of Single-Presentation Methods, which used a bisection task to
investigate whether subjective time runs differently for different
types of stimuli. In a ternary paired-comparison task, each trial
would present the standard (a picture of an oval or an eight-
consonant string) with some fixed duration (say, tst = 1000ms)
along with the test stimulus for a duration that varies across tri-
als. Trials with different types of test stimuli (or different standard
durations) could be randomly interwoven in a session and the
order of presentation of test and standard in each trial would also
be randomly determined. Fitting the psychometric functions in
Equations (12) to the resultant data would thus provide estimates
of the parameters of μ and σ that describe observed performance,
permitting a proper assessment of how subjective time varies
across conditions besides providing parameters describing deci-
sional determinants. García-Pérez and Peli (2014) illustrated this
approach in a study of spatial bisection that used the conventional
single-presentation format and its conversion into the ternary
paired-comparison format.
FITTING PSYCHOMETRIC FUNCTIONS
Current practice fits two-parameter (location and slope) psycho-
metric functions separately to data from each of the conditions
included in a study. Yet, when the same standard is used for all
conditions, model parameters describing the perceived duration
FIGURE 8 | The PSE at the standard duration is not a sufficient
condition for equality of time perception for test and standard
stimuli. Graphical conventions and indifference regions for absence or
presence of decisional bias as in Figure 7. (A) Different psychophysical
functions for test and standard may cross at or very near t = tst. In
this illustration, μs is the identity function whereas μt is given by
Equation (1) with αt = 3.01, βt = 0.83, and τt = −10. As regards the
scalar property in Equation (2), γs = 0.15 and γt = 0.10. (B)
Psychometric functions in the ternary task, showing the signature of
the PSE at t = tst = 700ms regardless of the presence (left column) or
absence (right column) of decisional bias and despite the different
psychophysical functions for test and standard. (C) Psychometric
functions for “test longer” responses in the comparative task, again
showing the effects of decisional and response bias.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 415 | 16
García-Pérez Does time ever fly?
of the standard should not vary across them. Psychometric func-
tions are thus expected to differ only in the parameters describing
subjective duration for test conditions. This implies that psycho-
metric functions ought to be fitted jointly across conditions with
some of their parameters constrained to have common values
across them. This strategy reduces the number of free parame-
ters needed to describe the data but it also entails a coherent use
of models and provides the means to test hypotheses concern-
ing the effect of manipulations. There are several other situations
in which some parameters must be regarded as common across
conditions, but these are determined by the experimental design.
For illustrative examples, see García-Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana
(2007a; 2009a; 2012; under review), Magnotti et al. (2013), or
García-Pérez and Peli (2014).
ADAPTIVE METHODS
Studies on time perception often use the comparative task to
estimate PSEs or DLs via adaptive methods that bypass estimat-
ing the psychometric function, directly targeting specific percent
points on it. This practice is unadvisable for several reasons.
Firstly, and least importantly, μt may differ from μs in a way
that they cross near t = tst. Thus, finding the PSE at or near tst
does not allow concluding that subjective duration is identical
for test and standard stimuli (see Figure 8). Secondly, due to the
effects of decisional and response bias on the slope and location
of the psychometric function in comparative tasks, PSEs or DLs
estimated from percent points are contaminated by these influ-
ences and do not portray time perception. Finally, and even in
the absence of the previous two problems, the most widespread
adaptive methods have been shown to provide percent-point esti-
mates that are biased in magnitudes which cannot be assessed
without knowledge of the shape of the psychometric function
(García-Pérez, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2011; Alcalá-Quintana
and García-Pérez, 2004, 2007; Faes et al., 2007; García-Pérez and
Alcalá-Quintana, 2007b, 2009b; Hsu and Chin, 2014).
The foregoing discussion does not mean that adaptive meth-
ods should be entirely abandoned. On the contrary, some up–
down methods provide dependable and efficient strategies for
data collection and, thus, they gather maximally informative data
for fitting psychometric functions. Adaptive methods tailored to
the peculiarities of equality and ternary tasks have recently been
developed (García-Pérez, 2014). For an illustration of their use,
see García-Pérez and Peli (2014). What should be avoided by all
means is the practice of estimating percent points by averaging
reversal levels.
PENDING ISSUES
It is unclear at this point whether the mathematical form ofμ and
σ in Equations (1)–(2) describe adequately the mean and stan-
dard deviation of subjective duration across the continuum from
a few milliseconds to several seconds. Empirical studies suggest
that a power function is adequate forμwithin narrow time ranges
but its parameters vary across ranges (Eisler, 1976), suggesting
that a power function is only piecewise approximate. Although
a yet unknown mathematical form might be more appropriate,
the narrow range of durations used in any given study supports
the use of Equation (1) on fitting psychometric functions. On
the other hand, the scalar property in Equation (2) is known
to be inaccurate in human timing but alternative mathematical
forms have been proposed (Killeen et al., 1997; Rammsayer and
Ulrich, 2001) that may prove more useful in practice. Also in this
respect, it is unclear whether the referent for the scalar property is
subjective time (as in Equation 2) or objective time.
Consideration of errors made by observers upon report-
ing judgments via the response interface has been intention-
ally excluded in this description. Extensions incorporating error
parameters for more accurate parameter estimation have been
discussed for analogous models elsewhere (García-Pérez and
Alcalá-Quintana, 2012; García-Pérez and Peli, 2014) and their
inclusion in the models presented here is straightforward.
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